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I. IntroductIon 
Asia is in a strong position to assert itself in global financial governance. The remarkable growth of the 
economies in the region and their integration in global trade and finance bestow upon Asian states 
considerable potential clout in international forums and institutions. However, Asia’s influence is not yet 
commensurate with its economic weight in either the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the Group 
of Twenty (G-20), which are, respectively, the most important institution and decision-making forum in 
global finance. Governments and central banks within the region will want to consider how to close the 
gap between their weight and influence in the IMF and the G-20, to the benefit of their own economic 
development and financial stability. Their non-Asian partners in these institutions of global financial 
governance will want to have the most dynamic countries in the world economy play their full and 
rightful role in these institutions. 
This paper provides an assessment of Asia’s position in global financial governance and suggestions 
for improving Asia’s standing in, and contribution to, international financial cooperation. The paper 
begins with an overview of Asia’s relationship with the Fund in the aftermath of the 1997–98 Asian 
financial crisis. Second, it reviews the Asian countries’ reaction to the 2008–09 global financial crisis 
and to the Fund’s treatment of the European countries in the present sovereign debt crisis. Third, the 
paper reviews East Asia’s progress in developing regional institutions for crisis financing and economic 
surveillance, which create opportunities for cooperation with the Fund and other global financial 
institutions. Finally, the paper concludes by outlining possible strategies for the Asian countries to gain 
greater influence in the Fund and in the G-20. 
II. overvIew of AsIA’s relAtIonshIp wIth the fund
Asia’s relationship with the Fund prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 can be best characterized 
as cool, but not hostile. Basically, the interaction between Asia and the Fund was in the context of the 
annual Article IV Consultations and the Fund’s advice on economic policies was considered broadly 
useful by Asian countries but there was no imperative to follow it. The Fund in turn was careful in how it 
treated the Asian countries and therefore was quite subtle and diplomatic at times in expressing its views. 
The picture changed dramatically once the crisis hit in 1997 as the mode of interaction changed 
from annual consultations to programs with the Fund. Indeed, the new relationship had a rocky start and 
the Asians became quite antagonistic toward the Fund. This antagonism persisted for a number of years 
even though the crisis was resolved and Fund programs ended. 
Essentially, the main reason for the breakdown in the relationship was Asian countries’ unhappiness 
with the macroeconomic and structural conditionality associated with the programs that were negotiated 3
with Thailand (August 1997), Indonesia (November 1997, August 1998), and Korea (December 1997). 
The conditionality contained in these programs was seen as overly harsh and intrusive and this soured 
the relationship. Asian countries were convinced that the Fund had misdiagnosed the problems the 
countries were facing and imposed excessively harsh and inappropriate conditions for the financing it 
was providing. Despite the fact that the Fund later on acknowledged the mistakes it has made during the 
Asian financial crisis, and changed its views, the damage had been done and the mistrust of the Fund by 
the Asian countries lingered.1 
A second reason came to the fore in 2007 when the Fund attempted to strengthen its surveillance 
over exchange rates with the adoption of the 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance. While exchange rate 
surveillance is obviously part of the Fund’s mandate, several important Asian countries, such as China and 
Malaysia, felt that some aspects of the new Decision were directed exclusively at them. The arguments for 
and against application of the Decision created tensions between Asia and the Fund, and once again the 
Fund had to modify its views. 
It remains to be seen whether the relationship is back on an even keel, although there are signs that 
it is improving. There was a positive change in the relationship in the context of the global financial crisis 
in 2008–09. While Asian countries made it perfectly clear that they would not engage in programs of 
any type with the Fund, they supported the Fund in its borrowing arrangements and in quota increases 
(which of course, Asian countries stood to benefit from the most). 
The stigma of being associated with the Fund, however, has still to disappear, although with the 
Fund having changed considerably from the days of the financial crisis, Asian countries should reconsider 
their attitude toward the Fund. Indeed, they can engage more fully with the Fund, and therefore influence 
its policies and decisions, without sacrificing their regional interests. 
evolution of Asia’s relationship with the fund
Conditionality
When Thailand devalued in July 1997, the Fund was quick to offer a program with substantial financial 
support. As the crisis spread across Asia, programs were also negotiated with Indonesia and Korea in rapid 
succession. By the end of 1997 all three countries had programs with the Fund. Malaysia, which was 
facing the same problems of large-scale outflows of portfolio capital and exchange rate pressures as the 
other three countries, decided not to have a Fund program and adopted a different strategy.2 
1. For example, as recently as July 2010, the former Managing Director of the Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn (2010), 
stated “We have made mistakes. But we also learned from our experience during the Asian crisis.” 
2. One of the key and controversial features of the Malaysian strategy was the imposition of capital controls. There is 
still debate on whether these controls were effective in enabling Malaysia to recover from the crisis more rapidly than its 
neighbors that went down the program road. See, for example, Johnson et al. (2006). 4
It is fair to say that the Fund saw the Asian financial crisis basically as a currency crisis and the 
policies in the programs that were implemented were accordingly designed. In a standard currency crisis 
triggered by speculators believing that the currency is overvalued, the standard prescription is to tighten 
monetary and fiscal policies and let the exchange rate go. This is precisely what the Fund prescribed. The 
Fund realized soon after that countries were facing a banking crisis as well. In the banking crisis case, 
the appropriate remedy would be to pump liquidity into the system through easier monetary policy and 
maintain aggregate demand through fiscal stimulus—exactly the opposite of the policies the Fund had 
initially included in the programs. 
Several factors were at work in causing a substantial drop in aggregate demand and growth; the 
collapse of exchange rates and stock markets, the bursting of real estate bubbles, and capital flight. In 
such circumstances, fiscal austerity compounded the problems and growth rates fell sharply. The initial 
fiscal tightening prescribed by the Fund was eased once it became evident that fiscal austerity was unlikely 
to generate sufficient resources in the context of declining growth rates. But the initial shock of fiscal 
tightening was considered to be severe and in retrospect it was the wrong policy. 
The Fund also expected that higher interest rates from a tighter monetary policy stance would lead 
to a reversal of capital flows, or at least reduce the outflow. But the Fund underestimated the impact of 
higher interest rates on businesses that had built up substantial debts and had very high debt-to-equity 
ratios. Higher interest rates led to widespread bankruptcies, which put banks that had loans to these 
businesses on their books under stress. The depreciation of the exchange rate further compounded the 
problem as a large proportion of the borrowings had been in foreign currency, and the fall in exchange 
rates dramatically increased the domestic-currency servicing costs of the loans. 
In sum, many in Asia believe that the Fund bore considerable responsibility for the severity 
and length of the Asian financial crisis. It misdiagnosed the crisis and then implemented policies that 
aggravated the situation. It has to be acknowledged that the Fund did reverse itself and Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Korea did come out of the crisis in much better shape. But the bitter taste of the initial 
macro conditionality remained. 
Equally, and perhaps more important was the structural conditionality that was incorporated in 
the programs with Asian countries. Generally speaking there was a major proliferation of structural 
conditions in Fund programs since the early 1990s. This process began when the Fund was involved in 
a host of programs with the transition countries in Eastern and Central Europe. These countries were 
looking to move from state-controlled economies to market economies and as a result they needed major 
institutional, legal, and regulatory reforms. This pattern of having a wide range of structural conditions 
was also followed in the case of the Asian countries, even though these countries were quite different. 5
As pointed out by Goldstein (2001), the number of structural policy conditions included in the 
programs with three Asian crisis countries was much larger than had been included on average in all Fund 
programs over the period 1996–99. The number of structural policy conditions (at the peak) amounted to 
140 for Indonesia, over 90 for Korea, and over 70 for Thailand. For all Fund programs during 1996–99, 
the average was about 50 structural conditions.3 
The expansion of structural conditions limited the scope for domestic policy choices, thereby 
reducing country ownership. There is considerable validity in the reasons advanced for the expansion in 
Fund structural conditionality.4 But at the same time, it must be noted that many structural reforms are 
microeconomic in nature and thus are likely to be more intrusive than macroeconomic policies. Country 
ownership of programs is essential for the design and implementation of these microeconomic measures, 
since they have a differential impact on various segments and vested interests in society.5 
Around 2000, in the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, it was generally felt that the 
Fund had gone too far in structural conditionality and overloaded programs with structural measures. 
Many structural reforms are not critical for the achievement of macroeconomic stability. There is also 
no evidence that programs with a greater number of structural conditions have been more successful. 
In fact, as shown in IMF (2001c), programs with more structural conditions have the same success rate 
as those with fewer conditions.6 Khan and Sharma (2003) argue that the two main dangers of increased 
structural conditions are, first, that they result in reduced country ownership of programs and therefore 
impair their effectiveness. And second, the failure to implement structural reforms that are not critical for 
macroeconomic stability may undermine confidence in the overall program, which could trigger reactions 
in domestic and international capital markets that could make the overall program objectives more 
difficult to achieve. 
Based on the experience of the Asian programs, it became clear that much more thought should 
be given to what structural reforms are critical to achieving the principal objectives of the program. 
These reforms will undoubtedly vary from country to country, but sharply pruning the list of structural 
conditions is possible without jeopardizing the success of the program or the ability of the Fund to be 
repaid. In other words, prioritizing or streamlining structural conditionality does not mean weakened 
overall conditionality.
3. This has been tabulated in Goldstein (2001) and IMF (2001c).
4. See IMF (2001a, 2001b, 2001c).
5. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between IMF conditionality and country ownership of programs, see Khan 
and Sharma (2003).
6. See also Lamdany (2009), which drew on a report of the Independent Evaluation Office of the Fund. 6
By 2001 the Fund acknowledged that structural conditionality in programs had expanded too 
much, and a major effort was made to streamline it. This effort was led by the new Managing Director 
of the Fund, Horst Kohler. An Interim Guidance Note on Streamlining Structural Conditionality 
was issued, which defined broadly the principles to determine the appropriate scope of structural 
conditionality in programs (IMF 2001b, box 3). In summary, these principles are:
n  Structural reforms that are critical for the achievement of the program’s macroeconomic objectives 
will generally have to be covered by IMF conditionality.
n  Structural reforms that are relevant—but not critical—for the program’s macroeconomic objectives 
and within the IMF’s core areas of responsibility may be subject to conditionality.
n  If structural reforms meet the macro-relevance test but are neither critical nor in the IMF’s core areas 
of responsibility, IMF conditionality would generally not apply.
These proposals represented an important move by the Fund away from a concept of 
comprehensiveness of structural conditionality to one of parsimony. It is interesting to note that the 
experience with programs negotiated after the issuance of the new Interim Guidance Note showed no 
falloff in the success rate of programs (Lamdany 2009). 
The 2007 Surveillance Decision
The Fund viewed the adoption of the 2007 Surveillance Decision in June 2007 as a “landmark” in surveil-
lance over the policies of member countries (IMF 2009). While the decision covered the whole range of 
policies, including monetary, fiscal, and financial-sector policies, greater attention was given to exchange 
rate issues. The Decision was expected to result in increased candor in assessing member country’s 
economic situation, outlook, and policies to achieve internal and external stability. 
In reality, the decision in a sense simply restated the Fund’s mandate to exercise surveillance over 
a member country’s economic policies while putting exchange rates at the forefront. Unfortunately, 
problems arose precisely in the exchange rate area. While it was a positive step that Fund staff was 
required to be more candid in its assessment of a country’s exchange rate policies, and particularly 
the appropriateness of the level of the exchange rate, this issue turned out to be difficult and highly 
contentious. The problem essentially was twofold: the “labels” that were to be attached to a country’s 
exchange rate policy; and the methodology for assessing the level of the exchange rate. 
Labels
Under the 2007 Surveillance Decision, the focus of exchange rate assessments should be to determine 
if the level of the real effective exchange rate (REER) is broadly consistent with the sustainability of the 7
current account, or equivalently, with an equilibrium evolution of the country’s net external assets. The 
current level of the REER is compared with the level that would result in a current account position 
consistent with a stable net external asset position, adjusting for temporary factors affecting the current 
account balance. The difference between these two is the degree of misalignment. 
The decision then went further and introduced the concept of a “fundamental misalignment” of the 
exchange rate. An exchange rate is fundamentally misaligned if evidence of a significant and permanent 
misalignment can be established.7 Staff was expected to include the term “fundamental misalignment” in 
reports whenever it found that this criteria established by the Decision was met. If not, staff would use the 
term “broadly in equilibrium” or “misaligned” (overvalued or undervalued). 
Methodology
The concept of an equilibrium exchange rate, and therefore the degree of misalignment of the current 
exchange rate, presupposes the existence of a suitable methodology to calculate it. The Decision relied on 
the work of the Fund’s Coordinating Group on Exchange Rates (CGER) to operationalize this concept. 
CGER outlines three approaches to estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate:8 
n  The macro balance approach, which compares the current account in the medium term with a 
so-called current account norm; 
n  The external sustainability approach, which compares the medium term current account with the 
current account balance that would stabilize the net external assets position; and
n  The equilibrium real effective exchange rate approach, which directly relates the REER to 
fundamentals.
The first two approaches were considered directly related to the framework of the Decision, 
while the third was expected to be a useful check on the results from the macro balance and external 
sustainability approaches. Of course, it was recognized that additional country-specific information and 
judgment would also play an important role in the assessment of the exchange rate. Nevertheless, the 
CGER methodology was considered as providing a strong basis for determining whether a country’s 
exchange rate was in equilibrium, misaligned, or fundamentally misaligned. 
Many member countries were uncomfortable with the Decision when it came time to implement 
it.9 They were particularly concerned with the label of “fundamental misalignment.” The opposition 
7. The Decision, however, did not indicate a numerical value for “significant misalignment,” although it did say that 
“permanent” referred to the medium term. 
8. See Lee et al. (2008). 
9. Even though the Executive Board of the IMF had approved this Decision in June 2007. 8
came from Asian countries, among which China and Malaysia felt the Decision was largely directed at 
them and other countries with fixed exchange rates.10 They were joined by several major oil producers 
(mainly those in the Gulf) that were also maintaining dollar pegs and running very large current account 
surpluses at that time.11 Essentially, their argument was that the CGER methodology had high degree of 
uncertainty and that assessments based on this methodology could be very misleading, if not altogether 
wrong. None of these countries were ready to be branded as fundamentally misaligned on the basis of 
what they considered inappropriate methodology (in the case of oil producers) or uncertain estimates 
that emerged from applying the methodology (in the case of Asian countries maintaining fixed exchange 
rates). 
Because of this opposition very little was achieved in applying the exchange rate aspects of the 
Decision during 2007–08. The first country to be labeled as fundamentally misaligned was Maldives, 
which had a dollar peg and was running current account deficits.12 It is interesting to note that the Fund’s 
Executive Board rejected the staff’s determination of Maldives’ exchange rate as being fundamentally 
misaligned. Many Executive Directors, including all the developing-country Directors, asserted that 
adequate information was not available to make such a determination. The other countries that were 
proposed by the staff to be similarly labeled simply delayed completing the Article IV Consultations so 
that their cases could not be brought to the Executive Board of the Fund. 
The Fund attempted to break the deadlock in 2008 with the proposal of the Managing Director to 
have “ad hoc” consultations for those countries where there was prima facie evidence that the exchange 
rate was fundamentally misaligned. This group included China and Malaysia in Asia and the major 
Gulf oil producers, including Saudi Arabia. However, even this did not help conclude long-delayed 
consultations with China and Malaysia. In the case of the oil producers, Fund staff dropped the 
fundamental misalignment label and simply referred to the exchange rates as being undervalued, noting 
that the country authorities did not agree with even this label, arguing that their policy plans, specifically 
fiscal policies, would eliminate this overvaluation in time. As a result of this compromise, the outstanding 
Article IV Consultations with the oil producers were completed in 2008. 
Given the impasse, and recognition by the Fund that there were problems with the Decision, key 
aspects of it were changed in 2009 (IMF 2009). A revised guidance to staff was issued eliminating the 
requirement to use the term fundamental misalignment but still calling for a clear and candid discussion 
10. In other words, several countries felt that this was an underhanded way for the Fund to push for flexible exchange 
rates. 
11. It should be recalled that oil prices rose sharply in 2007 and the first half of 2008, giving rise to dramatic increases in 
the value of oil exports. 
12. It was unfortunate that such a small country was to be the first test case. In 2007 the GDP of Maldives was just about 
$1 billion. 9
of the exchange rate. The proposal to use ad hoc consultations was also withdrawn as it was no longer 
relevant given the elimination of the label of fundamental misalignment. The Fund also explicitly 
recognized the uncertainties underlying the assessment of the level of the exchange rate and allowed 
government policy intentions over the medium term to be taken into account in the assessment. 
With these changes, which were approved by the Executive Board on June 22, 2009, the stalled 
Article IV Consultation with China was completed on July 8, 2009 and that for Malaysia on August 
14, 2009. It is clear that for about two years, the 2007 Surveillance Decision cast a shadow over the 
relationship between Asia and the Fund. In the end, the revised Operational Guidelines put to rest the 
most contentious issue of labeling and explicitly acknowledged that the search for complete accuracy 
in assessing the level of the exchange rate was futile. Any quantitative method, such as the CGER 
approaches, would necessarily have to be supplemented, and in some cases supplanted, by judgments and 
country-specific information including future government policy intentions. 
the 2008–09 Global financial crisis
Originating in the advanced countries, the US subprime mortgage market in particular, the recent crisis 
affected Asia through trade and financial channels. Of all the Asian countries, Korea and Indonesia were 
most affected through the financial channels. Korea encountered funding problems for banks in the wake 
of the seizing up of interbank markets globally in the fall of 2008. Indonesia faced elevated interest rates 
for government debt issuance. These countries could in principle have appealed to the Fund for assistance, 
but their experience with the Fund during 1997–98 made such an approach politically infeasible. Their 
unwillingness to approach the Fund ruled out an appeal to the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which was 
tied to IMF lending. Korea found shelter in a bilateral swap agreement between the Federal Reserve and 
Bank of Korea, which was supplemented by parallel agreements between the Bank of Korea and the Bank 
of Japan and People’s Bank of China. The Indonesian authorities struck an innovative agreement with a 
consortium of creditors led by the World Bank in early 2009. Fundamental policy adjustments were not 
necessary and neither arrangement provided for them. 
Despite this reluctance to approach the Fund for borrowing, Asian countries proved quite willing 
to augment the resources devoted to the institution. First, in the early stages of the crisis, Japan, China, 
Korea, and Singapore agreed to make resources available on a bilateral basis, should the Fund need to 
borrow, as part of a much larger network of bilateral borrowing arrangements. Second, eight East Asian 
countries and/or central banks agreed to participate in the enlargement of the New Arrangements to 
Borrow (NAB), which replaced the bilateral agreements. Third, Asian countries have been supportive of 
the 2009 and 2010 decisions to increase the quotas of the Fund, as they stood to gain the most from such 10
increases. So, the global financial crisis thus elicited responses from Asian states that were a mixture of 
aversion and cooperation. 
fund “stigma” in Asia
The extreme reluctance of Asian countries to borrow from the Fund, and their wariness with respect to 
its policy advice and surveillance, for reasons discussed above, is now widely described as a “stigma.” This 
stigma is manifest in the reluctance of governments to turn to the Fund in the 2008–09 global economic 
crisis. As discussed previously, it cannot be denied that the IMF is unpopular in East Asia and often 
dismissed in elite discourse among policymakers within the region. However, three observations are in 
order. 
First, this stigma is a constructed collective attitude, which means it is not only the product of 
popular political backlash against the institution that attended painful adjustment requirements during 
1997–98. The aversion to the Fund has also to a significant extent been cultivated by influential people 
and institutions within the region and reinforced by elite discourse. 
Second, the stigma is based on a selective reading of the Asian crisis and is backward looking. IMF 
conditionality during 1997–98 contained serious mistakes, but other elements of conditionality—such 
as the elimination of the overvaluation of currencies and large current account deficits, consolidation of 
the banking sector, and strengthening of financial regulation—were certainly appropriate. Most of the 
countries in the region completely avoided financial contagion from the United States and Europe during 
2008–09 because they carried out these reforms. It can certainly be argued that European countries 
and the United States would have been better off if they had done the same. With larger loan amounts 
and streamlined conditionality in the recent crises, the Fund’s programs have evolved a great deal since 
1997–98. The popular reputation of the Fund in Asia does not currently give due account to either 
consideration. 
Third, because it is largely a deliberate construction, the stigma of the Fund is reversible. When 
governments, central banks, and regional institutions decide that cooperation with the Fund is desirable, 
the aversion to it can be ameliorated. Countries in other regions have been subject to equally severe 
austerity at the hands of the Fund but have not similarly ostracized the institution. Stigma, in other 
words, should not be taken as a fixed parameter within which the international community and regional 
cooperation have no choice but to work.
III. euro AreA debt crIsIs
The attitude of East Asian governments toward the IMF’s involvement in the euro area debt crisis 
further indicates their posture toward the organization. The Fund has committed very large amounts in 11
cofinancing arrangements with the European Union and its member states—€26 billion for Portugal (24 
times quota), €22.5 billion for Ireland (23 times quota), and €30 billion for Greece’s May 2010 program 
(32 times quota)—amounts considerably larger in absolute magnitude and relative to quota than its 
commitments to Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea during the 1997–98 crisis. 
This contrast has led some commentators to cry foul, arguing that the IMF’s treatment of the euro 
area cases is far more lenient than the Asian cases 15 years ago, that the IMF would not lend on this basis 
to Asian countries even now, and that the difference owes to the stronger European position in Fund 
governance.13 Arvind Subramanian and Devesh Kapur, for example, have chided the IMF for being a 
“Euro-Atlantic Monetary Fund” for its excessive indulgence of European borrowers.14 The appointment 
of the French Minister of Finance, Christine Lagarde, to replace Dominique Strauss-Kahn as Managing 
Director in June 2011 confirmed a European bias at the IMF in the minds of many Asians.
There can be no dispute about the numerical dominance of the European members in the Fund or 
their influence over its operations. Nor is there any dispute with the argument that the Asian programs 
of 1997–98 were underfunded and laden with conditions that proved in some cases to be mistaken. 
Furthermore, it is also a fact that when leading countries such as the United States encountered their own 
crisis they followed policies that they had rejected for the emerging markets in 1997. But it can be argued 
that Asian officials should also acknowledge a number of additional considerations.
First, as discussed in section II, the Fund has come a long way in addressing the criticism of its 
treatment of Asian countries during the 1997–98 crisis. Moreover, it has expanded the number and 
type of financing facilities, including precautionary windows with no ex post conditionality such as 
the Flexible Credit Line (FCL). With quota and NAB increases, it has tripled the resources that it 
can mobilize in a crisis. And the Fund has streamlined the conditionality that it applies to Stand-By 
Arrangements (SBAs). With respect to surveillance, the Fund recently introduced “spillover” reports on 
the external consequences of developments in the systemically important countries. The IMF has moved 
in directions that are consistent with Asian preferences and arguments.
Second, the reform of the IMF has been in response to several factors among which the Asian 
position is significant. There is no denying that other drivers were also influential; among them are the 
2008–09 crisis and the response through the G-20. But the reconsideration of program design within the 
Fund predated the mature countries’ crisis and the conversion has to be taken at face value. Asian financial 
regionalism in the form of the CMI also highlighted the possibility that the region might someday “go its 
13. See, for example, Eisuke Sakakibara’s criticism quoted in “IMF Slammed as It Launches Charm Offensive,” Emerging 
Markets, April 5, 2010, available at www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/2478804/IMF-slammed-as-it-launches-charm-
offensive.html. 
14. See Arvind Subramanian and Devesh Kapur, “The G-20 and IMF Reform,” Business Standard, April 1, 2009.12
own way” in crisis finance. But, the most important factor that gave weight to Asian views in the IMF was 
the impressive growth of the region, to which the IMF wants to be relevant, and its rising weight in the 
world economy. The IMF is a very different creature now than it was in 1997 because it has responded to 
Asia. 
Third, that European borrowers are the first members to benefit from these far-reaching reforms at 
the Fund is ironic. Given the stigma attached to borrowing from the IMF in East Asia, however, this is 
not a coincidence. In the absence of this stigma, it is quite possible that both Korea and Indonesia would 
have borrowed from the Fund in late 2008 and/or early 2009. The Fund staff has been quietly urging 
Asian governments to apply for some of the new facilities, the FCL in particular, but so far to no avail. 
Therefore, the fact that Asian governments have not borrowed from the IMF on the newly favorable terms 
is in significant measure a matter of choice. 
Fourth, the precedents set in the euro area programs and the experience of cooperating closely with 
the euro area authorities will inform the Fund’s response to contingencies in other regions, including 
Asia. Southeast Asian countries can rely on these precedents if and when they next appeal for access to the 
IMF. Due to the stigma of the Fund in the region and the region’s present external surpluses and financial 
stability it is unlikely that the larger emerging-market countries will draw in the immediate future. 
But that does not imply that the days of IMF lending to developing and emerging markets in Asia are 
completely over.
Iv. GovernAnce of the fund
Historically, Asia has had a less prominent position in the governance of the IMF than either Europe 
or the United States. Despite periodic review, the adjustment of quotas and voting shares for member 
countries has lagged far behind changes in relative economic position, which has operated to the disad-
vantage of the fast-growing countries of East Asia in particular. Over the last decade, however, there has 
been a concerted effort to redress this discrepancy and that effort has produced significant results. The 
combined quotas of ASEAN+3 represent 15.7 percent of total quotas and their votes comprise 15.2 
percent of total votes (see table 1). If ASEAN+3 voted as a bloc, therefore, it could now exercise a veto 
over decisions requiring the supermajority of 85 percent. 
It is worth noting, though, that ASEAN+6—including Australia, New Zealand, and India—
collectively command almost 20 percent of quotas and 19.2 percent of votes. The region has a better 
chance of influencing the Fund when it is constituted broadly. Defining the region broadly is facilitated 
by the configuration of the constituencies in the Executive Board (and thus the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee). There, Australia and New Zealand are grouped with Korea and the 
Micronesian states, among others. Four Executive Directors represent East Asia—those representing 13
Japan, China, the Australian- and Korean-led constituency, and a Southeast Asian constituency led by 
Singapore and Indonesia—and collectively control 17.6 percent of total votes (see table 2). Adding the 
South Asian constituency, led by India, brings the total wielded by the five chairs on the Fund Executive 
Board to 20.4 percent. 
Voting shares are an inadequate measure of countries’ influence in the Fund, however, because 
formal votes are very rare and Executive Directors’ personal qualities, analytical skills, and working 
relationships with the Managing Director, other Directors, and the Fund staff are also important. 
Unfortunately for Asia as a region, its member states have sometimes not been particularly active or 
proposed prominent initiatives for the evolution of the Fund. Although Asian representatives are now 
becoming more assertive, when the chips are down, some Asian countries have still been reticent. The 
process of selecting the Managing Director is a case in point. 
Asian governments are sometimes frustrated that the United States and European countries have 
a “lock” on the positions of the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the Fund, 
owing to an informal arrangement referred to as “the Convention.” This Convention should be broken 
and these appointments should go to the best-qualified candidates. Because regional diversity is an 
important consideration, a non-European will sometimes be the best candidate in the case of the Fund 
and a non-American will sometimes be the best candidate in the case of the World Bank. This does not 
necessarily mean that the Managing Director must be Asian, but, as the fastest growing region with 
lending commitments to the Fund, Asia has a strong claim to this position.
But Asian officials have not competed with much determination for this position and Asian 
governments cannot legitimately complain about the Convention unless they do. Not since 1999 has 
there been a formally declared Asian candidate for the Managing Director post. During the round in June 
2011, several Asian names were mentioned for the position but in the end none was formally nominated. 
Nor was there regional solidarity behind the emerging-market candidate, Agustin Carstens, Governor of 
the Bank of Mexico. Instead, the finance ministries of Japan and China seem to have struck bargains for 
appointments at the Deputy Managing Director (DMD) level—retaining a DMD position in the case 
of Japan and receiving one for the first time in the case of China.15 Holding two such positions certainly 
elevates Northeast Asia’s position in the Fund, but for now the European hold on the top position is 
maintained. 
But after well over a decade of meetings of the ASEAN+3 finance ministers and their leaders, the 
development of the “ Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation” (CMIM), and the establishment of 
15. Zhu Min was promoted from Special Advisor to the Managing Director to Deputy Managing Director after Christine 
Lagarde assumed the Managing Directorship in July 2011. IMF, “IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde Proposes 
Appointment of Mr. David Lipton as First Deputy Managing Director and Mr. Min Zhu as Deputy Managing Director,” 
press release no. 11/275, Washington, July 12, 2011.14
the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), greater regional solidarity might have been 
expected during this process. Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s departure for reasons related to French domestic 
politics was widely expected in early 2011, well before his eventual resignation in May. The absence 
of regional solidarity in selecting a successor was thus not likely due to being taken by surprise but to 
more fundamental political factors, including competition between China and Japan. Overcoming these 
divisions will be critical to Asia’s one day securing the Managing Director position.
v. fInAncInG And surveIllAnce
Asian countries’ reservations about the Fund have led ASEAN+3 to develop regional arrangements for 
crisis financing and economic surveillance. These arrangements change the international financial archi-
tecture for the region in important ways. Contrary to the hopes of some, though, they cannot be relied 
upon alone to provide financial stability; instead, they will have to work with the IMF and other multi-
lateral institutions for the time being. This section considers the development of these arrangements and 
the avenues for cooperation with the Fund.
financing16
In response to the experience of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, the ten countries of ASEAN and the 
three Northeast Asian states (ASEAN+3) launched the CMI, a network of bilateral swap arrangements 
on which members could draw in the event of another crisis. In 2009, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers 
decided to “multilateralise” the CMI, by which they meant collectivize on a regional basis. The CMIM 
became formally operational in March 2010.17
Several aspects about the CMIM are worth noting. First, the 13 countries plus Hong Kong commit 
a total of $120 billion to the facility, giving them the right to draw in various proportions of their quota. 
Second, this is a “self-managed reserve pooling arrangement,” which means that foreign exchange reserves 
are held in separate national accounts but earmarked for contributions to financial rescue packages. The 
CMIM can thus be understood as an agreement on joint decision-making to disburse from the national 
accounts simultaneously. Third, the CMIM necessitated agreement on the governing arrangements, 
including the relative shares of Japan, China, and Korea. Japan and China, in which Hong Kong’s share 
is included, have equal shares under this agreement. By making lending decisions with a two-thirds vote, 
one of the large countries could in principle be outvoted—which represents a potentially important 
commitment to regional decision-making. Fourth, the CMIM retains a provision of the CMI known as 
16. This and the following sections draw from Henning (2011).
17. On the evolution of these arrangements, see Sussangkarn (2010); Henning (2002, 2009, 2011); Grimes (2009); 
Hamada, Reszat, and Volz (2009); Kawai (2009a and 2009b); Park and Wang (2005), among others.15
the “IMF link,” requiring a country to have an IMF program before it can borrow more than 20 percent 
of its allotment under the CMIM. Finally, and as a partial consequence of this IMF link, neither the CMI 
nor the CMIM has been activated as of now. The prevalence of current account surpluses and abundant 
reserves and the relative absence of plain vanilla balance-of-payments crises help to explain nonactivation. 
But governments in the region were also dissuaded from tapping the CMI or CMIM owing to the need 
for a Fund program to do so. 
Asian financial regionalism has been deeply ambivalent about the IMF, motivated by resentment 
of the institution yet facilitated by its presence. The IMF link inhibited the use of these arrangements 
in the recent crisis, owing to the “stigma” of the Fund in Asia. At the same time, the CMIM is too 
small to be viable in a crisis without additional financing from other sources, with the IMF being the 
leading candidate to provide it. So, if the CMIM is going to be used in the foreseeable future and evolve, 
it will have to specify the modalities for working with the IMF. By the same token, the future of the 
IMF depends in part on repairing the damaged relations with this fast-growing region. Rehabilitating 
the institution within Asia is facilitated by modifying its facilities and programs to better match the 
preferences of Asian members, an area where it has arguably made great strides, and cooperating with 
regional institutions including CMIM and AMRO, which can impart greater local ownership of 
operations. Cooperation is thus important for both Asia and the IMF.
There are several ways in which Asian regional arrangements could cooperate with the IMF for their 
mutual benefit. First, they can do so through traditional balance-of-payments financing arrangements. 
Under such arrangements, the IMF and CMIM could disburse to countries that have negotiated an 
SBA with the Fund. This is the contingency that was envisaged as CMI and CMIM were established. 
ASEAN+3 and the IMF have recently discussed and settled upon the procedures for coordinating their 
policies and disbursements under this scenario.18 
While there might be countries in the region that encounter a traditional balance-of-payments crisis, 
the region could well experience crises more closely resembling the contingencies of the 2008–09 crises—
the seizing up of capital and bank-funding markets, the imminent collapse of a too-big-to-fail bank or 
another large private financial institution, and the need for cross-border liquidity support. The IMF has 
equipped itself for these contingencies with the adoption of the FCL and Precautionary Credit Line 
(PCL), and is further considering a Global Stabilization Mechanism (GSM) or a Short-Term Liquidity 
Line (SLL).19 Owing to the problem of stigma, however, no East Asian country has applied for either of 
these “precautionary” facilities. 
18. ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Statement, Hanoi, Vietnam, May 4, 2011.
19. Under the enhanced FCL, countries with “very strong economic fundamentals” and policies can qualify for an IMF 
credit line, on which they can draw at their option without submitting to ex post conditionality. See, for example, IMF, 16
One of us (Henning 2009) has argued that qualification for the FCL should be deemed to satisfy 
the ASEAN+3 requirement that most disbursements under the CMIM be linked to a Fund program. 
In taking such a decision, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers could mobilize the CMIM for precautionary 
purposes, which is not possible under the present CMIM agreement. Such a decision would also make the 
FCL more attractive to Asian members and probably soften the stigma of the Fund. Similar cooperation 
could be envisaged with IMF lending through a PCL. 20 
Former Thai Minister of Finance Chalongphob Sussangkarn (2010) raises another intriguing 
possibility for engaging outsiders in cooperation among ASEAN+3. He suggests creating associate 
memberships or contributing partnerships in the CMIM in order to allow Australia, New Zealand, and/
or India to participate short of full membership status. While not sitting in the governing bodies of the 
CMIM, nor eligible to borrow from it, these countries could contribute funds during an activation and 
attend surveillance and other meetings through associated status. 
The concept could be taken a step further to allow countries outside the region, such as the United 
States, and multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, to participate. The possibility that the IMF might 
top up financial packages by bilateral lending to members of a regional arrangement and by lending 
directly to the regional arrangement itself has been floated within the Fund (IMF 2010). However, such a 
step would have to overcome institutional and policy obstacles at both the IMF (stemming from concerns 
about control) and ASEAN+3 (which is not empowered to borrow).
surveillance
ASEAN+3 has also been engaged in a parallel negotiation to strengthen the regional regime of economic 
and financial surveillance. The hope of many is that a robust surveillance mechanism would permit the 
CMIM to eventually lend without the borrower also negotiating an IMF program. Such a step would 
complete the transition of East Asian financial arrangements to an Asian Monetary Fund. Accordingly, 
in June 2011, ASEAN+3 created an independent secretariat in 2011 in Singapore, the ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office. While this is a significant step, an institution on which ASEAN+3 can 
build, the group would have to endow it with more resources and analytical capacity before it could serve 
as the functional equivalent of the IMF bureaucracy and thus permit the region to go it alone in a crisis.
Mexico: Arrangement under the Flexible Credit Line, IMF Country Report no. 11/11, January 2011, available at www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1111.pdf. Mexico requested and was granted access up to 15 times its quota. 
20. The PCL applies to countries “with good policies but still facing some remaining vulnerabilities,” which would 
therefore have to commit to light ex post conditionality and be monitored. IMF, “IMF Enhances Crisis Prevention 
Toolkit,” press release no. 10/321, August 30, 2010, available at www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10321.htm. 17
Regional surveillance of economic policy has developed gradually over more than a decade within 
ASEAN+3.21 Consensus emerged only within the last few years on the creation of an independent 
secretariat to conduct policy reviews and on the secretariat’s location. In spring 2010, ASEAN+3 finance 
ministers decided that AMRO would become operational in 2011 and be located in Singapore.22 AMRO’s 
mandate is to “monitor and analyze regional economies, which contributes to the early detection of risks, 
swift implementation of remedial actions, and effective decision-making of the CMIM.” It will collect and 
analyze information on the economic and financial conditions and policies of members and present its 
analysis to the deputies and ministers in meetings of the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) 
and the deputies’ bodies charged with managing CMIM. Its mandate is thus limited to information and 
analysis; it is not charged with developing proposals and submitting them to the board as is the Managing 
Director and staff of the IMF.
AMRO’s staff will be relatively modest in size at the outset. In spring 2011, the ministers 
appointed former People’s Bank of China Deputy Governor Wei Benhua to be the founding Director 
of the Office. He is responsible for launching the new secretariat, including hiring the deputy directors, 
professional economists, and support staff. Under the informal agreement between Japan and China, 
Yoichi Nemoto, Deputy Vice Minister in the Japanese Ministry of Finance, is expected to succeed Wei as 
Director in summer 2012. While ASEAN+3 officials agreed that AMRO, its director, and staff are to be 
“independent,” the working relationships are only now being defined. 
The establishment of AMRO raises the question of its relationship to the IMF. The Fund of course 
conducts the most robust surveillance of the 13 members of ASEAN+3 on an annual basis and makes its 
findings available to all of the other members. The Article IV Consultations staff reports and Executive 
Board reviews are made available to all of the members. Economic developments and vulnerabilities are 
addressed as well in the Fund’s Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific, World Economic Outlook, 
and Global Financial Stability Report. Although officials within the region have sometimes been unhappy 
with the messages in these reports, they also receive a great deal of high-quality information about their 
regional neighbors through these multilateral channels.
Identifying its comparative advantage—where it can provide value added—is a basic challenge for 
AMRO. AMRO does not have sufficient staff and resources to replicate the work of the IMF. But AMRO 
can contribute by: (i) providing contrasting assessments of vulnerabilities within the region when the 
21. Contributions on ASEAN+3 surveillance include Kawai and Houser (2007), Institute for International Monetary 
Affairs (2005), Wang and Yoon (2002), Kawai (2009b), Henning (2009), and Takagi (2010). 
22. ASEAN Finance Ministers, Joint Media Statement of the 14th Meeting, Nha Trang, Vietnam, April 8, 2010, 
paragraph 14, available at www.aseansec.org/24491.htm (accessed on August 30, 2010). ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers, 
Joint Media Statement, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, May 2, 2010, available at www.aseansec.org/documents/JMS_13th_
AFMM+3.pdf (accessed on August 30, 2010).18
director and staff disagree with the findings of the IMF; (ii) updating assessments more frequently than 
the annual cycle for Article IV Consultations by the Fund staff; and (iii) backstopping a surveillance 
discussion in which Asian officials might be more candid with one another than in the presence of 
officials from outside the region.23
ASEAN+3 and AMRO have an incentive to consult with the Fund on the timing, sequencing, 
and substance of Article IV Consultations with common members in order to work its comparative 
advantage. For its part, the Fund could provide technical advice during the establishment of AMRO, as 
Asian institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and ASEAN secretariat are also likely to 
do. Second, as Kawai (2009b) has proposed, AMRO officials could be included in the Fund’s Article IV 
surveillance missions to ASEAN+3 countries. Doing so might raise some sensitive issues for both the IMF 
and ASEAN+3 and could be done only with the consent of the member state being reviewed but deserves 
serious consideration. 
It is useful to underscore that the development of regional surveillance has critical ramifications for 
East Asia’s long-term relationship to the IMF. At the outset of the CMI, Asian officials acknowledged that 
surveillance would have to evolve in parallel with regional financial facilities if the region were to become 
genuinely self-reliant. ASEAN+3 would have to develop the analytical capacity to define the group’s own 
policy conditionality for CMIM. Although AMRO is yet to be tested, it does not appear that ASEAN+3 
officials have yet devoted the resources or mustered the commitment to raise regional surveillance to 
this level. For the time being, therefore, it appears that any activation of the CMIM will have to be in 
conjunction with IMF lending. 
vI. conclusIon
Asia’s role in the IMF—the premier institution of global financial governance—has been limited. 
Given the size and strength of Asia in the global economy, it could reasonably be argued that the region 
“punches below its weight.” This is partly the result of a conscious choice by Asian countries to keep the 
Fund at arm’s length, reflecting the bitter memories of the Fund’s role in the Asian financial crisis. But it is 
also due to the fact that Asia has not, at least until recently, pushed to have a larger say in global financial 
circles. 
There are welcome signs now of Asia asserting itself and demanding greater voice and representation 
in the Fund through increases in quotas and shares. But, as in any zero-sum game, if Asia is to gain shares 
in the Fund, some others will have to see their shares reduced. The losers will mainly be the Europeans 
23. A recent report by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO 2011) suggests that there is substantial room to debate 
the conclusions of the Fund regarding its ability to assess financial soundness. The report mainly criticizes staff and the 
Executive Board for failing to sound alarms when warnings were necessary, rather than vice versa. 19
and they are unlikely to countenance further reductions in their quotas and votes beyond the 2010 
reforms in the Fund. Therefore, Asia will need to persist in this endeavor and establish common unified 
positions among the Asian countries on matters of regional and systemic importance and then push its 
agenda actively in the Fund. Playing its rightful role in the Fund need not detract from Asia’s existing 
regional financial arrangements, including the possibility of eventually creating an Asian Monetary 
Fund.24 
The G-20 has opened another channel for Asia to gain a significant role in global financial 
governance. With five Asian countries included in the G-20, or six if Australia is counted as part of Asia, 
there is an opportunity for Asia to influence the content and directions of the G-20 initiatives, given 
Asia’s importance in the G-20 (see table 3). Such an opportunity arose when Korea hosted the G-20 
Summit in Seoul in November 2010, the first time an Asian country had chaired the G-20. While the 
views of Asia and for that matter the other non-G7 members of the G-20, are reflected to an extent in the 
communiqués, it is unclear what the impact of the non-G7 countries has been on decisions made by the 
G-20. 
Two specific actions could potentially change the picture in a positive way. First, within the G-20 
Asia should seek to form common ground and coalitions with other members. It is obvious that, given 
the size of Asia, a common position among the Asian members on major systemic issues would carry 
considerable weight in the discussions of the G-20. To strengthen the position of all non-G7 countries, 
Asian countries could reach out to the other non-G7 members and involve them in taking a unified 
position. As discussed in this paper and shown in table 3, the weight of Asia—particularly if India, 
Australia, and New Zealand are included in the Asian group—is substantial and on many issues could 
well carry the day. 
Second, and equally important, is for the Asian members of the G-20 to seek out and reflect the 
views and concerns of Asian countries that are not members of the G-20. The absence of these countries 
from participating in decisions that ultimately affect them makes the G-20 appear to be an exclusive club, 
like the G-7, catering to only a select few.25 This is what presumably led the government of Singapore to 
form the Global Governance Group (3G), which includes five Asian countries (Brunei, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, and Singapore) among its 27 members. 
A mechanism should be found whereby the excluded countries have a voice in the G-20, even if 
that can be accomplished only indirectly. The 3G is one such model. The International Monetary and 
24. Other regional funds, such as the Arab Monetary Fund and the Andean Reserve Fund, have coexisted quite nicely 
alongside the International Monetary Fund. 
25. More generally, given the structure of the G-20, about 35 percent of the world’s population and about 80 percent of 
the countries in the world would appear to have no voice at the meetings of the G-20. For more detailed discussion of this 
issue, see Truman (2010). 20
Financial Committee (IMFC) of the Fund is another model. In the IMFC, the countries that are part of 
multicountry constituencies in the Fund’s Executive Board are represented at the table by a governor who 
is charged with representing the views of all the members of the constituency. One possibility would be to 
design a similar procedure for the G-20 as well, involving regular meetings of Asian G-20 members with 
the representatives of other Asian countries.26 These two actions could both strengthen the position of 
Asian countries in the G-20 and give voice and a stake to all Asian countries. 
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Table 1     Asia’s position in IMF quotas and votes, as of July 25, 2011
Member







Percent of total 
(post-2010 reform)
Brunei Darussalam 215 0.090 2,892 0.110 0.063 0.089
Cambodia 88 0.040 1,615 0.060 0.037 0.064
Indonesia 2,079 0.870 21,533 0.860 0.975 0.951
Lao PDR 53 0.020 1,269 0.050 0.022 0.05
Malaysia 1,774 0.750 18,479 0.730 0.762 0.75
Myanmar 258 0.110 3,324 0.130 0.108 0.132
Philippines 1,019 0.430 10,933 0.430 0.428 0.434
Singapore 1,408 0.590 14,820 0.590 0.816 0.801
Thailand 1,441 0.610 15,145 0.600 0.674 0.666
Vietnam 461 0.190 5,347 0.210 0.242 0.258
ASEAN 8,796 3.700 95,357 3.770 4.127 4.195
China 9,526 4.010 95,999 3.820 6.394 6.071
Japan 15,629 6.570 157,025 6.240 6.240 6.138
Korea 3,366 1.420 34,404 1.370 1.800 1.731
ASEAN+3 37,317 15.700 382,785 15.200 18.561 18.135
Australia 3,236 1.360 33,104 1.320 1.379 1.332
New Zealand 895 0.380 9,686 0.380 0.263 0.278
India 5,822 2.450 58,955 2.340 2.751 2.629
ASEAN+6 47,269 19.890 484,530 19.240 22.954 22.374
Bangladesh 533 0.220 6,073 0.240 0.224 0.241
Bhutan 6 0.003 803 0.030 0.004 0.034
Pakistan 1,034 0.430 11,077 0.440 0.426 0.432
Sri Lanka 413 0.170 4,874 0.190 0.121 0.144
ASEAN+10 49,256 20.713 507,357 20.140 23.729 23.225
Total 237,762 100.000 2,515,997 100.000 100.000 100.000
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; SDR = special drawing rights
Source: International Monetary Fund, www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx.23 2










United States 421,964 16.770 42,122 17.720
Japan 157,025 6.240 15,629 6.570
Germany 146,395 5.820 14,566 6.130
France 108,125 4.300 10,739 4.520
United Kingdom 108,125 4.300 10,739 4.520
Brunei Darussalam 2,892 0.115 215 0.090
Cambodia 1,615 0.064 88 0.040
Fiji 1,443 0.057 70 0.030
Indonesia 21,533 0.858 2,079 0.870
Lao PDR 1,269 0.051 53 0.020
Malaysia 18,479 0.736 1,774 0.750
Myanmar 3,324 0.132 258 0.110
Nepal 1,453 0.058 71 0.030
Philippines 10,933 0.435 1,019 0.430
Singapore 14,820 0.590 1,408 0.590
Thailand 15,145 0.603 1,441 0.610
Tonga 809 0.032 7 0.003
Vietnam 5,347 0.213 461 0.190
Subtotal 99,062 3.940 8,944 3.763
China 95,999 3.820 9,526 4.010
Australia 33,104 1.318 3,236 1.360
Kiribati 796 0.032 6 0.002
Korea 34,404 1.370 3,366 1.420
Marshall Islands 775 0.031 4 0.001
Micronesia 791 0.032 5 0.002
Mongolia 1,251 0.050 51 0.020
New Zealand 9,686 0.386 895 0.380
Palau 771 0.031 3 0.001
Papua New Guinea 2,056 0.082 132 0.060
Samoa 856 0.034 12 0.005
Seychelles 849 0.034 11 0.005
Solomon Islands 844 0.034 10 0.004
Tuvalu 758 0.030 2 0.001
Uzbekistan 3,496 0.139 276 0.120
Vanuatu 910 0.036 17 0.010
Subtotal 91,347 3.630 8,025 3.391
Bangladesh 6,073 0.242 533 0.220
Bhutan 803 0.032 6 0.003
India 58,955 2.348 5,822 2.450
Sri Lanka 4,874 0.194 413 0.170
Subtotal 70,705 2.810 6,775 2.843
(table continues on next page)24 3










Afghanistan 2,359 0.094 162 0.070
Algeria 13,287 0.529 1,255 0.530
Ghana 4,430 0.176 369 0.160
Iran 15,712 0.626 1,497 0.630
Morocco 6,622 0.264 588 0.250
Pakistan 11,077 0.441 1,034 0.430
Tunisia 3,605 0.144 287 0.120
Subtotal 57,092 2.270 5,191 2.190
Total Asian constituencies 414,205 16.495 38,461 16.176
Total eligible Fund votes 2,511,0423 99.8044 237,762 100.000
1. Voting power varies on certain matters pertaining to the General Department with use of the Fund’s resources 
in that Department.
2. Percentages of total votes (2,515,997) in the General Department and the Special Drawing Rights Department.
3. This total does not include the votes of Guinea, Madagascar, and Somalia, which did not participate in the 
2010 Regular Election of Executive Directors. The total votes of these members are 4,955—0.20 percent of those 
in the General Department and Special Drawing Rights Department.
4. This figure may differ from the sum of the percentages shown for individual countries because of rounding.
Source: International Monetary Fund, www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx.25 4
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